As access to the Internet has diffused throughout post-industrial societies the idea of e-voting -or casting a secure and secret official ballot to electoral officials via the Internet at the poll site, kiosk, or remote home and workplace -has been widely debated. E-voting has been regarded as a logical extension of developments in commerce and government. Proponents claim that the introduction of this facility into the electoral process will serve numerous functions: adding convenience to the voting process, allowing the electorate to become more knowledgeable and informed, greatly increasing the efficiency and security of elections, making access to the electoral process more widely available, and facilitating new forms of direct democracy 1 . Among these arguments, one of the most important and influential concerns the potential impact of evoting on boosting electoral turnout, especially for the younger wired generation 2 . By increasing the convenience of casting a ballot, e-voting can be regarded as analogous to the use of postal, absentee, oversees, or advance ballots, facilities already widely available in many countries 3 .
Any potential gains in voting participation from new technology are particularly important for the European Union, given that only 49.2% of all European citizens voted in the June 1999 EP elections, hemorrhaging from almost two-thirds (63%) of the electorate just two decades earlier 4 .
The argument developed in this paper makes three claims: first, the evidence from the distribution of Internet access in Europe confirms that, at least in the short-term, the impact of introducing e-voting into elections to the European parliament could probably deepen and worsen the existing socioeconomic 'voting gap'. Second, even if we assume that use of the Internet gradually 'normalizes' and becomes widespread throughout society, there are still good reasons to be skeptical about any potential revolutionary benefits from e-voting on turnout. E-voting can be seen as most analogous to our experience of using postal or advance voting. Evidence from comparing turnout during the 1990s in established democracies suggests that such voting facilities have little or no impact on electoral participation. More fundamental structural reforms to the European Union that could both maximize electoral choices and electoral decisiveness are required to have a major impact on strengthening turnout in EP elections. Tinkering with e-voting is insufficient, the equivalent of fiddling while Brussels burns, unless elections are seen as relevant and important to people's lives. Lastly, it is argued that the most important role of information technology in democracy lies, instead, in its potential capacity to strengthen the public sphere by expanding information resources, channels of communication, and networking capacity for many organized interest groups, social movements, NGOs, transnational policy networks, and political parties 5 . The Internet is already creating major challenges to the decision-making processes in the EU, exemplified by networks of activists protesting at Gothenberg. As such the debate about e-voting may well prove largely irrelevant to the primary political impact of the Internet on democracy within the European Union.
To support these claims, Part I outlines what we know about the digital divide in access and use of the Internet among and within the 15-EU member states, and examines whether there is any evidence that the online population has gradually 'normalized' from 1996-2001 as Internet access has become more widely available. Part II considers evidence for the impact on electoral turnout of analogous voting facilities, exemplified by postal ballots, as the closest existing experience that is equivalent to e-voting. The conclusion considers the broader implications of the analysis and what we know about the political functions of the Internet for European democracy.
Part I: The Digital Divide in European Access
Critics argue that both technological and social problems create substantial barriers to the practical implementation of e-voting. The first claim is that the technology required to authenticate voters and to assure the accuracy and integrity of the election system either does not exist, or is not widespread enough in society, to be equitable and effective. Task forces reviewing the evidence in many countries have proved skeptical about the idea of e-voting as an automatic 'magic ballot' that could entice more people to vote, prevent electoral fraud, improve vote-counting, and make elections more representative, suggesting that further exploratory pilot studies are required before wider adoption 6 . Democratic electoral systems must meet certain stringent standards of security, secrecy, reliability, accuracy, efficiency, integrity, and equality, making the administrative challenges of e-voting more difficult than the implementation of many common forms of electronic commerce or government. When tried in small-scale pilot studies, so far the security and technological problems involved in casting hundreds of votes electronically have often proved problematic. In October 2001, for example, the residents of the Dutch towns of Leidschendam and Voorburg were given the chance to vote via the net on the choices for the merged towns' new name. The vote was abandoned when it became obvious that more votes had been cast than there were electors 7 . The Arizona Democratic primary election, which also experienced many technical glitches, has been widely quoted, although it remains difficult to assess how far we can generalize from the particular circumstances surrounding this unique contest 8 . Pilot schemes using e-voting have been explored in local areas, including in Geneva 9 .
They are in the process of being tested among selected wards and boroughs in the local The following year this number had risen to 26 million. The online population has subsequently roughly doubled every year since then, reaching an estimated 544 million people by early-2002 13 .
The bursting of the dot com bubble appears to have slowed, but far from halted, this process.
[ Table 1 about here]
The rapid diffusion of the Internet within the EU, drawn from Eurobarometer surveys from 1996 to 2001, is illustrated in Table 1 . As the data shows, use of the Internet has been remarkable during these years, rising from about 5% with access in 1996 to almost one third of all Europeans in spring 2001. The surge in Internet access has increased at a faster pace than access to computers, although this also rose rapidly during the same period, from 31% to 45% of all Europeans. Access to the Internet still remains far behind the distribution of some other common household technologies, such as the availability of VCRs (76%) and Teletext (67%), but nevertheless by the turn of the century more Europeans already had access to the Internet than to either satellite TV, pay-TV, or a fax machine. The rise in most television-related technologies has been steady but relatively slow during these years, compared with the rise in all the computer-related technologies. Nevertheless the diffusion of the Internet during these years was also extremely uneven among European Union member states, with Scandinavian nations far ahead of Southern Mediterranean Europe (see Table 2 and Figure [ Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]
What of the digital divide within societies, and is there evidence that social inequalities have gradually closed during the first few years as Internet use has spread more widely?
Diffusion theory by Everett Rogers suggests that those who adopt any new technology in the initial phase are often fairly exceptional, being more affluent and educated than the general population. As a technology becomes more widespread, however, so the social inequalities in access narrow -and thus the social distribution of its consequences change 17 . Table 3 shows the profile of the online community in Europe in spring of 1996 and 2000. The distribution of
Internet access in the mid-1990s is familiar, with the Internet population in Europe concentrated among the younger generations, more affluent households, university graduates, managers and white collar workers (as well as students), and, to a lesser extent, among men. More importantly, the pattern of Internet access in spring 200 shows the extent of the growth but also a fairly similar social profile of the online community in Europe: the strongest percentage point growth has been among the most affluent households, the well-educated, and among managerial professionals, although there is perhaps some evidence that use has spread rapidly among the early-middle aged as well as the youngest age group. For multivariate analysis Table 4 shows the strength and significance of all these factors when entered into logistic regression models predicting use of the Internet. A comparison of the strength of the unstandardized coefficients in 1996 and in 2000
shows a similar pattern. Nevertheless the models suggest slight evidence of a very modest weakening over time in the role of age, education, and income in predicting Internet access in Europe, with a sharper weakening the gender gap in Internet access, although at the same time the influence of social class actually appears to increase during these years. Moreover the differences among EU member states like Sweden and Greece remain strong and significant despite even after introducing the prior social controls into the model, suggesting that societallevel factors like government educational and training policy, levels of industrial development, the pricing structure of telecommunications, and the location of high tech companies are important factors influencing access above and beyond particular differences in the social and demographic composition of these countries.
Overall the results of the analysis suggest that if e-voting via computer terminals in the home or workplace were to be introduced into European elections within the next few years 18 , thereby increasing the convenience for those with Internet access, and reducing the barriers to participation, then the unequal patterns of Internet access could be expected to widen many of the familiar socioeconomic disparities in electoral participation that already exist, including those of social class, education, gender, and income 19 . Yet there is one important qualification to this conclusion because it does seem likely that, if this facility were available, then the typical generational profile of the online community might make voting marginally more attractive for younger citizens who were interested in participating. Of course none of this evidence is relevant to other functions of the Internet for elections, such as the introduction of Internet voting via public kiosks at traditional polling stations, or in public locations such as libraries, town halls, schools and community centers. On the other hand, the real advantages of using the Internet via these forms of transmission are reduced for citizens, because people still have to find the time from work or family responsibilities to travel to the public location, while the disadvantages of the Internet over paper-methods for administrative security remain.
[ Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Part II e-Voting and Electoral Turnout
But for the purposes of exploring the arguments further let us assume that the social inequalities revealed so far represent the first stage of technological diffusion when, like the spread of popular mass media such as telephones, radios and television in earlier decades, eventually use and access become 'normalized' in the population at large. If, say, all EU nations eventually came to approach the current levels of access evident in leading-edge countries such as Sweden and the United States, with about two-thirds or more of the population having access,
and if e-voting were to be introduced at this stage, would it be likely to increase electoral participation? There still remain many reasons to be skeptical of these claims. The theory that we can use to understand electoral participation in European elections, which is developed more fully elsewhere (Norris 1993) , suggests that the incentives motivating electors to cast a ballot represent a product of electoral costs (in registering to vote, sorting out information and deciding how to vote, and then actually casting a ballot), electoral choices (determined largely by the range of parties and candidates listed on the ballot paper), and electoral decisiveness (influenced by how far votes cast for each party determine the outcome for the European parliament and for EU governance) 20 .
Electoral Costs & Voting Facilities
The theory suggests that rational citizens will be less likely to vote if they face major electoral costs in registering as electors, in finding suitable information about the issues, parties and candidates that is useful in making voting decisions, or in casting a ballot to express their voting choice. 'Electoral costs' concern the time, energies and informational demands required to register and cast a ballot. In this regard, the use of e-voting can be seen as essentially similar in principle to other voting facilities commonly used in many countries, such as the widespread availability of special arrangements for mobile populations, the use of mail, proxy, absentee, or overseas votes, as well as polling facilities for the elderly and disabled in nursing homes and hospitals, and elections held on a weekend or holiday rather than a workday. Registration procedures are often believed to be an important hurdle. In many countries like Britain, Sweden and Canada, registration is the responsibility of the government, conducted via a door-to-door canvas or annual census so most eligible citizens are automatically enrolled to vote. In others like the United States, France and Brazil citizens have to apply to register, often well ahead of the election, and complicated, time-consuming or restrictive practices can depress participation levels 21 . Standard rational choice theories suggest that, all other things being equal, the deterrent of higher costs reduces electoral participation.
Electoral Choices
The question is whether any reductions in the costs of casting a ballot from voting facilities are sufficient to overcome the many other important hurdles to electoral participation.
Electoral choices are determined by broader systemic characteristics of the political system. The most important concerns the options available on the ballot, notably the range of parties and candidates contesting elected offices, and the policy alternatives listed for referenda issues. In turn, these options can be related to the type of electoral system, the party system, and other basic political institutions like parliamentary or presidential executives. The most important factor influencing electoral choices is whether there is a two party, two-and-a-half parties, moderate multiparty systems, or polarized multiparty system. Rational choice theories suggest that in general, all other things being equal, the greater the range of choices available on the ballot, the more the public will find a party, candidate or referenda issue option that reflects their viewpoint and interests, the stronger the incentive to vote. In elections to the European parliament, citizens are presented with a range of parties on the ballot paper in each member state, but insofar as there is little difference between the parties on some of the major issues facing the future of the European Union, then citizens face a restricted choice in European elections 22 .
Electoral Decisiveness
There may also be a trade-off between electoral choices and electoral decisiveness, or the political benefits anticipated from casting a ballot in determining the composition of parliament and government, the legislative and public policy agenda, and the outcome of referenda issues.
In elections that are anticipated to be close, on the basis of past results, opinion polls or media commentary, voters are likely to feel a far greater incentive to get to the polls than in those where the outcome appears to be a foregone conclusion. Of course the actual benefits of casting a single vote may, on purely rational grounds, be illusory, because one vote is unlikely to decide the outcome of an election, but this is not to deny the psychological belief that in close elections, each vote counts for more than in safe contests. Hence for example British studies have found that the closer the difference in the national share of the vote between the major parties, the higher the level of electoral participation in the postwar era 23 . The marginality of British constituencies has also commonly been found to be one of the best predictors of turnout in each seat 24 . Widening the range of choices on the ballot paper may allow citizens to find a closer match to their interests, but if the party system becomes too fragmented with multiple choices then the outcome of casting a vote in the election for smaller parties will be unlikely to influence the outcome for government and the policy agenda. Moreover a wider range of choices also simultaneously increased the costs of becoming informed about alternative candidates and parties.
Given this understanding, this study theorizes that the most probable effect of introducing e-voting from the home or workplace would be to marginally reduce the costs of casting a ballot.
But e-voting would be unlikely to affect other important costs, such as the cognitive demands required to sort out the relevant information to decide how to vote, nor would it influence electoral choices and electoral decisiveness. As such the Internet cannot be regarded as a magic panacea for all the ills of European elections, which are the result of more deep-seated problems in how far voters feel that they can determine the outcome of European Union politics through casting a ballot in European elections.
Voting and registration facilities
For evidence we can compare the impact on turnout of voting and registration facilities, as the closest equivalents to e-voting. Voting facilities that can reduce the costs of voting include the use of absentee, overseas, postal, advance ballots, proxy voting, facilities for registration, and how far polling stations are distributed widely throughout the community for groups who might otherwise have difficulty in getting to the polls, such as the population in residential homes for the elderly, in hospitals, and military personnel posted overseas 25 . Timing is also believed to be important: most countries hold their elections on a single day, usually at the weekend that makes it easier for employed people to visit a polling station. In a few countries, however, elections are spread over more than one day; in India, for example, where there are more than 600 million voters and some 800 thousand polling stations, balloting takes place on a staggered basis during a month across the whole country. In a comparative study, Oregon has moved to all mail ballots. The 1993 National Voter Registration Act requires all states to make voter registration available in motor vehicle bureaus, as well as by mail, and at various social service agencies, and it also forbids removing citizens from the rolls simply for not voting.
Nevertheless as the Florida case vividly illustrated in the 2000 presidential contest, the efficiency of the registration and voting procedure at state level can leave much to be desired. Studies suggest that easing voter registration processes has slightly improved American voter turnout, with a one-time bump when new processes are introduced, but that the impact is not uniform across the whole electorate, as it has had the most impact increasing participation among middleclass citizens 29 .
Comparative evidence on the impact of registration processes on turnout is less well established. Studies have long assumed that voluntary registration procedures, where citizens need to apply to be eligible to vote, are an important reason why American turnout lags well behind many comparable democracies 30 . In countries with application processes, including the United States, France, and Australia, prospective voters must usually identify themselves before an election, sometimes many weeks in advance, by registering with a government agency. In other countries, the state takes the initiative in registering eligible citizens, through an annual census or similar mechanism. But what is the impact of this process? Katz compared the electoral regulations in thirty-one nations and found that nineteen states used an automatic registration process, while in contrast twelve registered citizens by application 31 . The analysis of electoral participation based on this classification of countries suggests that the registration hurdles may be less important than is often assumed, since average vote/VAP proved to be identical in both types of system 32 .
To examine some of the available evidence on these issues, drawn from a broader forthcoming study examining patterns of activism worldwide 33 , Table 5 [ Table 5 about here]
The result of the analysis in Model A in Table 5 shows that, after controlling for levels of development, among voting facilities, only polling on a rest day proved to provide a significant established democracies. In the final model, the most important factors concern the type of electoral system (whether PR or not), the frequency of elections (where more frequent contests depress turnout through voter fatigue), the length of women's enfranchisement, the use of compulsory voting 38 , and after introducing all the controls, among voting facilities only the provision of special polling booths proved significant at conventional levels.
This limited analysis only briefly examines a few of the structural factors that can be expected to influence the costs, choices and decisiveness of elections, and survey analysis is necessary for a fuller examination of the social psychology of voting participation 39 . Nevertheless if we can draw a valid analogy between the provision of existing voting facilities like postal ballots and the proposed use of the Internet to register and vote from home or work, then this evidence
suggests that e-voting would have only little or no effect on turnout. Elections need to matter, and there need to be an effective range of real choices on the ballot for citizens to believe that they can make at least a symbolic difference to the outcome through casting a vote. If European elections are widely regarded as largely irrelevant to the policy outcome, or if people do not feel that they are presented with choices which represent their interests, then no matter if casting a vote becomes as easy as clicking a mouse, participation levels will, unfortunately, probably remain miserably low.
Conclusions and Discussion
Modern lifestyles mean that people have become increasingly comfortable with the security of online banking, shopping, and stock market trading, so advocates of e-voting hope that this process could generate similar levels of trust and confidence. The use of e-voting could be regarded as building upon other increasingly-common electoral and political uses of Internet for information and communications, such as the use of websites and email by parties, candidates, and interest groups, the publication of election results online, the provision of voter registration facilities, and the use of the Internet for the submission, collection, and disclosure of campaign finance. But the evidence presented in this study suggests that at present, even if the technical issues could be overcome, the digital divide in Internet access in Europe means that it would be premature to consider adopting e-voting at home or work on a wide-scale basis. If the digital divide eventually closes, then problems of unequal access become less important.
Nevertheless the impact that can be expected from the introduction of e-voting at home or work could expect to be modest, at best, if judged by the available evidence on the impact of equivalent facilities like postal voting. E-voting is unlikely to prove a 'magic ballot'. Technological quick fixes, while superficially attractive, cannot solve long-term and deep-rooted civic ills.
This is not to argue that the Internet fails to serve many other important functions during election campaigns, including for civic engagement. Content analysis of party websites suggests that the Internet provides a more level playing field for party competition, providing information and communication functions that are particularly important for minor and fringe parties 40 .
American surveys show that online communities can serve both 'bridging' and 'bonding' functions strengthening social capital 41 . Experimental evidence demonstrates that party websites on the Internet do indeed promote civic learning, and in this regard information on the Internet is analogous to campaign information from newspapers or television news 42 . Nevertheless survey evidence from those Americans who use the Internet during campaigns in the United States strongly suggests that e-voting would be used most heavily primarily by people who are already most likely to participate, thereby still failing to reach the apathetic and disengaged 43 .
Perhaps the primary impact of the Internet on democratic life concerns its ability to strengthen the public sphere by expanding the information resources, channels of electronic communication, and the networking capacity for many organized interest groups, social movements, NGOs, transnational policy networks, and political parties with the technical knowhow and organizational flexibility to adapt to the new medium 44 . The impact of the Internet on intermediary organizations across Europe is evident from the way that it facilitates networks of activists concerned to challenge the decision-making processes in the EU. 
